

The Issue

The issue is whether the President can force the U.S. Senate to accept a person who believes that Negroes should not be treated like other people.—Clarence Mitchell, Sr., legislative representative of the NAACP, on the appointment of William H. Rehnquist, an anti-civil rights Goldwaterite, to the Supreme Court.

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When Imperialism Masks Itself As Altruism

In a sarcastic reference to Senator Fulbright and defeat of the foreign aid bill, Deputy Defense Secretary Packard at a press conference Nov. 4 said "I hope we don't go back to a Fortress Arkansas posture." If the Pentagon wants to see a real Fortress Arkansas, it should read the speech delivered by the other Senator from Arkansas, McClellan, the day foreign aid was defeated. Sen. McClellan said the bill contained only one item deserving of support—the \$250 million it would have authorized for East Pakistani refugees. The chauvinism and isolationism to which Nixon and Rogers covertly pandered after the UN vote on China found uninhibited expression in the McClellan speech. He called the vote "this insult to America's good will and unparalleled beneficence." He inserted a table in the Congressional Record showing that the U.S. had given \$43 billion in aid since World War II to the nations which voted against the U.S. on China. "When they so viciously bite the very hand which has sustained them," McClellan said, "it is time to stop giving them our taxpayers' money." This is the kind of talk which goes down far better in rural and small town Arkansas than Fulbright's idealism. Those attacking Fulbright on foreign aid would do well to consider how differently the U.S. would look to the rest of the world if the other Senator from Arkansas were chairman of Senate Foreign Relations.

"Foreign Aid" A Misnomer

Both Senators from Arkansas voted no when the foreign aid bill was finally rejected. But on the way to that final ballot, they voted quite differently. To look at their contrasting positions on the various amendments offered is to begin to see the multiplicity of issues involved. Lumping them all together in a so-called "foreign aid" bill gives an erroneous impression of what the fight was all about. Nor can the various votes on various issues simply be classified as "internationalist" or "isolationist." Let us begin with the issue of Greece, which ranked high on the Pentagon's concerns. The Nixon Administration programmed \$90 million in military aid to the Greek dictatorship this fiscal year and \$118 million next fiscal year. The foreign aid bill, as reported out of committee by Fulbright, called in effect for a ban on all military aid to Greece until free institutions have been restored. This is in accord with the 46 to 8 vote by which the NATO Assembly as recently as Sept. 27, called on all the NATO powers to press for the restoration of democracy in Greece. Secretary Rogers, in his Oct. 30 statement on the defeat of the foreign aid bill, said we "cannot retreat from the realities of our in-

A Money Tree For Private Business

The present [aid] program is designed primarily to serve private business interests. The search for foreign investment opportunities by the largest American corporations is relentless and irrepressible, as the biggest profits are to be found abroad, where the tax bite can frequently be reduced or averted. Moreover, the risk of loss due to political instability, riot, revolution or expropriation, has been largely lifted from the investor and shifted to the U.S. Government. OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, backed by the Federal Government, readily insures American companies against risks abroad. The multi-million dollar losses incurred by American copper companies, resulting from the nationalization of their holdings by Allende's Marxist regime in Chile, are likely to be borne—not by the companies—but by the American taxpayer. Our foreign aid program has become a spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad!

—Church (D. Idaho) in the Senate Oct. 29 (abr.).

terdependence with the rest of mankind." Which represents such a retreat? The Nixon insistence on aid to the Greek dictatorship, despite the views of our NATO allies, or the Fulbright call for an arms embargo? Packard said we might have to withdraw our 6th fleet from the Mediterranean without Greek and Turkish bases. Is that internationalism or imperialism? When the Administration pressed successfully for restoration of Greek military aid, McClellan voted for it and Fulbright voted no.

Or let us take the vote on the Buckley amendment, where Fulbright was allied with the Administration. New York's rightist Senator would have cut the \$139 million recommended for a group of UN organizations to \$37.5 million. This would have been seen as a China Lobby reprisal for the exclusion of Taiwan. It would have had a crippling effect on the UN Development program, its Children's fund, the FAO world food program, the World Health Organization and the miserable pittance UNRWA provides for Palestinian Arab refugees. Fulbright spoke strongly against the cut, as did Javits, and it was defeated 55 to 28. McClellan voted with Goldwater, Dole, Eastland and most of the Southern Democrats for the Buckley amendment. But the battle lines shifted, and the Administration was dependent on these same right-wing votes when it came to the heart of the struggle, which was not over disbursements but over the war-making authority.

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Was The Amchitka Test Worth The Fears and Animosities It Aroused?

Was the Amchitka test worth the fears and animosities it aroused in Canada, Japan and elsewhere? "The test has no real purpose," Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky of Stanford told the *New York Times* Nov. 3, "and is being held because of technological inertia." He said the Spartan system for which the giant warhead was tested would be unable to differentiate between incoming rockets and decoys, that its warheads would tend to destroy each other, and that the first wave of our ABMs would black-out our own radars.

More Testing Ahead?

Imagine what our press would be saying if the Russians were ignoring international protest and environmentalist fears to hold a test of this kind out in the North Pacific! The most important long range effect is to weaken the non-proliferation treaty. *Asahi*, one of Japan's biggest papers, pointed out that the treaty pledged the big powers to end the nuclear arms race, that we put pressure on the Japanese to sign but we're now going ahead with a major nuclear test. The NPT, like the earlier atmospheric test ban treaty of 1963, committed the US and the USSR to work for a treaty banning all tests. But a newly released comprehensive report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says it is doubtful whether either side "strongly desires" a complete ban now. The U.S. could get one by giving up its insistence on on-site inspection; the USSR by returning to its earlier offer of 3 inspections a year. If SALT, as seems probable, freezes the number of ABMs but allows qualitative improvements, the arms race and testing underground may escalate in a race to improve both ABM and MIRV.

Senator Muskie, in releasing a staff report by his disarmament subcommittee, pleads for an end to underground testing to brake the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, to spare the world the environmental dangers of more large underground tests, and to prevent other nations from developing their own weapons. Senator Case told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at a hearing Oct. 28 that recent technical advances were not being fully exploited in the existing U.S. seismic monitoring system. He said total funds for monitoring research and deployment had been reduced by one-third since 1963, down from \$41 million then to less than \$13 million this year. By contrast the two underground Alaskan tests have cost \$200 million. The inference is that the nuclear authorities are more interested in improving weaponry than the means of policing

Another Nixon Tax Gift To Corporations

Yesterday the Commissioner of Internal Revenue announced that corporations will not be subject to tax for undistributed profits which accrue from the "freeze" on dividends provided by the President's Executive order. I seriously doubt the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has statutory authority to exercise administrative discretion to suspend a statutory tax to accommodate an executive order.

This action is in keeping with an apparent effort by this administration to eliminate all corporate taxation. Earlier this year the adoption of the asset depreciation range wiped out \$40 in corporate taxation in the next decade. The revenue act which just passed the House of Representatives at the administration's request "washed out" a total of another \$52 billion of corporate taxation in the next decade. These losses in corporate taxes ominously point to an increase in individual tax rates after the election of 1972.

—Vanik (D. Ohio), militant member of Ways and Means, speaking in the House Oct. 13.

a full ban.

Information presented to the Joint Committee on behalf of a group of 14 eminent scientists said on the basis of existing unclassified technology, the threshold of sure detection could be lowered to 2 kilotons. Since 1960, according to the Muskie staff report, the U.S. has conducted four times as many announced underground tests as the USSR and would benefit from a complete ban. The SIPRI report provides evidence that there have been many more tests on both sides than the announced number, and that there are other secret non-seismic ways of monitoring an underground ban.

A new report of the UN Secretary General on the world arms race shows that annual expenditures rose one-third from 1960 to 1970, from \$150 billion to \$200 billion. The total for the decade is almost two trillion dollars! Six countries—the US, the USSR, China, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany—account for four-fifths of these expenditures but they also eat into the scanty resources of every nation. At the present rate, the UN experts estimate, annual expenditures may reach \$300 to \$350 billion by the end of this decade. Total world outlay on arms is almost 30 times as large as its outlay on development—\$200 billion for the one, \$7 billion for the other. These are the dimensions of this institutionalized madness.

How Control Profits When So Many Corporations Hide The Figures?

The problems faced by President Nixon's recently created Price Commission provide a timely illustration of how our ignorance of corporate affairs may frustrate public policy. Although the President promised that corporate profits would not be controlled directly, he emphasized the Price Commission would look to the profit records of certain strategic industries in determining whether particular price increases were justified. But this is easier said than done. There are no reliable data available on the profits of particular industries.

The only information currently available of profitability in manufacturing industries is gathered for the FTC Quarterly Financial Report on Manufacturing. Yet in many cases these "industry" data are worse than useless; they are not only extremely aggregated—e.g., electrical machinery, equipment and supplies—but individual industries include the entire consolidated profits of large corporations that operate across many industries.

For example, ITT's profits are included in a single FTC "industry" despite the fact that nearly half its profits are

earned from foreign operations, another substantial amount from nonmanufacturing industries, and the remainder from such diverse manufacturing industries as electronics, paper, baking, publishing and chemicals. Yet, powerful corporate interests have succeeded to date in resisting efforts by the FTC to require corporations to report their profits on an industry rather than a consolidated basis.

Nor can this problem be brushed aside by arguing that the new Price Commission will be given subpoena powers and will therefore develop its own data. It is entirely unrealistic to expect that this is something that can be done on an ad hoc basis in the crisis atmosphere within which the Price Commission will inevitably make its decisions. Despite all the loose talk about the vast powers of the Federal Government, the unfortunate truth is that it does not have sufficient economic facts to do this job.

—Prof. Willard Mueller, Univ. of Wisconsin, formerly with the FTC, speaking at Ralph Nader's Conference on Corporate Accountability, Washington, D.C. Oct. 30.

On Pentagon Propaganda About The U.S. Becoming A Second Rate Power

The notion that the U.S., through inadequate defense expenditure, is about to become a second rate power, is now being propagated by the Pentagon to prepare the way for a bigger arms budget next year. This is the sheerest nonsense. Here are some basic figures, as culled from the latest edition, just arrived from London, of the *Military Balance* study for 1971 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Dollar Figures Tell A Different Story

In the first place U.S. military expenditures continue to be far greater than Soviet. The U.S.S.R. is spending \$55 billion this year; the U.S., \$78 billion. Soviet per capita defense expenditure was \$222; U.S. \$373. The USSR was spending a larger portion of its Gross National Product on defense (11% as against our 7.8%) but the Soviet GNP was \$312 billion, or less than a third of the U.S. GNP which was \$977 billion.

In nuclear strategic forces the U.S. continues to be several years ahead technologically. This is reflected in our ability to deliver a far larger number of nuclear warheads. The USSR is trying to make up in quantity of ICBMs for this disparity. Soviet ICBMs rose in number from 50 to 460 between 1961 and 1967 while ours rose from 63 to 1,054. In 1967 we set out to develop multiple warheads instead of increasing the number of missiles. By this year the Soviets had 1,510 ICBMs while we still had only 1,054. But all but 54 of our missiles were solid fuel while only 60 of the Soviet's were the quicker-firing solid fuel variety.

The Soviet Union is still testing and has yet to deploy a multiple cluster warhead while we have passed that stage and are already deploying multiple independently targeted vehicles, the MIRV. Of our 1,054 ICBMs, 500 Minutemen are being equipped with 3 MIRVs each. By 1975 our ICBM force will be able to deliver 2,054 separate warheads on separate targets. *It will have doubled its striking capacity.*

The same disparity in our favor exists in Europe and at sea. The U.S. and the NATO forces have some 7,000 nuclear warheads in the European theatre as against about 3,500 in the hands of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. At sea, the Soviet nuclear strategic submarine fleet may soon draw closer to that of the U.S. in numbers but is far out-distanced in warheads and in range. The Soviets are only now testing an SLBM with an estimated range of 3,000 miles which would make it comparable to our Polaris. The Soviets have about 350 underwater launchers as against our

Unfortunate Analogy Dept.

It is unfortunate, perhaps, that each generation of weaponry must purchase geometrically improved capabilities with geometrically increased costs. However, this has been a problem since the crossbow supplanted the lance—the U.S. Navy did not create it.

—Admiral Radford (ret), protesting in a letter to the Washington Post Oct. 13 its opposition to the F-14 as costly, cumbersome and (like the carriers it is to protect) of dubious value.

The Admiral's argument is apt here, but not we think, to his side of the argument. It was relatively simple crossbow (and longbow) warfare, after all that did so much to make obsolete the heavily armed, mounted, lance-bearing knight of medieval Europe... Encased in so much metal that he had to be hoisted onto his mount, the lance-bearing fighter was rendered helpless by the simple arrow that—if it did not pierce his armor—could easily fell his horse. Just so, there is a school of thought which holds that the heavily and expensively defended carrier can be rendered inoperable by comparatively simple Soviet weapons.

—Washington Post editorial reply same day.

656. But 432 of our launchers are the Polaris A-3 with triple warheads and 64 are the newer Poseidons with at least 10 MIRVs each. The Soviets may catch up to us in numbers of nuclear submarines by the mid 70s but by that time we will have increased the number of our underwater strategic ballistic missiles "from about 1,500 (capable of attacking 656 separate targets) to over 5,400 (capable of attacking some 5,000 separate targets)." In addition we are already developing a new underwater monster, ULMS.

A similar proliferation of warheads is taking place in our bombing fleet through the addition of the new Short Range Attack Missile or SRAM. *This will do for the bomber what MIRV does for the ICBM.* While our bomber force is still about three times as large as the Soviet, the number of nuclear warheads each bomber carries will be increased enormously by SRAM. Each B-52 could eventually carry up to 24 SRAM while the proposed new B-1 bomber would be able to carry 32 SRAM. The ISS survey says, "The Soviet Union has shown no apparent interest in matching this particular effort." All this would give us an overkill of stupefying proportions.

Fulbright Terms Nixon's Boost in Military Aid "Pax Americana By Proxy"

Judging from the amounts contained in this bill—amounts totaling more than \$3.2 billion—it is "business as usual" for foreign aid, despite the state of our economy, the Government's fiscal dilemma, and our domestic needs. This bill would authorize \$1.3 billion more than the amount appropriated for these programs in the 1970 fiscal year.

The distortion of the aid program for military purposes continues. Of the amounts approved by the committee, \$1.7 billion is for military and related aid and \$1.2 billion is for economic aid, not counting the special authorization for Pakistan relief. This compares with the 1970 program when \$1 billion was for economic aid and \$815 million went for military purposes.

And the money in this bill for military aid represents only about one-third of the total military aid planned to be distributed around the world in this year. At the same time the President seeks to assure the American people that the United States is winding down its military involvement abroad. Yet, in the last year the executive branch has adopted

a new client state in Cambodia, reversed a long standing ban on arms to Indonesia, doubled our aid to Korea, waived the Congressional ceiling on arms to Latin America and Africa and the list goes on.

In fiscal year 1970 Congress appropriated \$421 million for military aid and credit sales. This year the President asked for \$1.2 billion for these two programs—three times the amount Congress provided only two years ago. What does this vast increase in military aid signify? Does it mean that U.S. policy is now to carry on a Pax Americana by proxy, with arms as the carrot for encouraging foreign cooperation?

The \$3.2 billion is just a down payment of the total price of the foreign aid program, just the tip of the foreign aid iceberg. The total price tag on all foreign aid and related programs for fiscal 1972 is actually \$9.5 billion. And if the cost of all these and other aid programs is projected over the next five years, the grand total comes to approximately \$51 billion.

—Fulbright, on Foreign Aid, October 26.

Either The Nixon Doctrine Is Obsolete or The Visit To Peking A Fraud

(Continued From Page One)

The foreign aid bill, as it came from the Fulbright committee was an anti-war and an anti-imperialist measure. The foreign aid program over the years has provided the first stealthy steps toward military commitment in Indochina. Programs first sold as foreign aid were later cited as authority for armed intervention. It was therefore natural that the foreign aid bill should become the vehicle to reverse the process. The Administration then made it clear that it preferred to veto the bill and drop foreign aid altogether rather than accept amendments which would force it to wind up the war in Indochina. Its first target was the Cooper-Church amendment which would have prohibited the use of funds for U.S. forces in Indochina for any purpose other than withdrawal. Its second was the Symington-Case amendment to put a ceiling on involvement in Cambodia, which threatens to become a second Vietnam. When the Administration succeeded in knocking out the first and weakening the second, many supporters of foreign aid like Fulbright, Nelson, Tunney and Hatfield among others voted against the bill.

Cambodia—A New Vietnam?

The final vote reflected the anxieties triggered by the revelation in the *New York Times* Oct. 13 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning the expansion of the Cambodian armed forces to more than 500,000 men by 1977. This would mean putting nearly half the adult male population under arms. It would also boost aid for Cambodia to half a billion dollars a year by 1977. Fulbright said that the Administration's actions, in planning to transfer the war from Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos, "strike me as being quite inconsistent" with the supposed purpose of Nixon's trip to Peking. "I think the longer we prolong the war, and certainly we do so by expanding it in Cambodia," he told the Senate, "the more difficult it will become for the President to achieve any significant agreement with the Chinese." The Nixon Doctrine of (in Dulles's phrase) "letting Asians fight Asians" to contain China for us is either obsolete or the new gestures toward

Who Suffers When "Aid" Is Cut

Many U.S. businessmen are as anxious as overseas recipients to resurrect in some form the scuttled foreign aid bill. . . . Among other things, the aid program provides about \$1 billion of sales annually for American manufacturers, gives U.S. shipping companies about one-fourth of their total revenue from outbound cargo. . . . Late yesterday the Pentagon released details of the potential impact of the Senate rejection. The negative vote there wiped out—at least temporarily—Defense Department plans to award the following contracts; \$175 million to McDonnell Douglas Corp. for aircraft; \$116 million to General Electric Co. for aircraft engines; \$61 million to Lockheed Corp. for aircraft and maintenance services; \$89 million to Bell Helicopter for helicopters; \$10 million to Chrysler Corp. subsidiary for vehicles . . .

—Robert Keatley, *Wall Street Journal*, November 3.

China are a fraud.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is fighting not against foreign aid but against the use of foreign aid as a cloak for interventionism, a cover for secret actions by the military and the CIA which undercut the power given Congress by the Constitution to decide the basic questions of war and peace. The Committee by splitting a substitute measure into two bills, one for military and the other for economic assistance, has helped to clarify the issue. The new measures heading for a Senate showdown as this is written contain many of the restrictions on the military and the CIA in Indochina and elsewhere which were in the original bill. This is not a fight over foreign aid but an effort (1) to get us finally and completely out of Indochina and (2) to substitute multilateralism and a genuine internationalism in helping other nations for an imperialism which has too long succeeded in masking itself as altruism. The scarred landscape of Indochina should be enough to open the eyes of this generation to the realities.

Nov. 9

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